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Admissions Quotas in Metropolitan Areas and 
Competition between Universities in Korea  
By JAEHOON KIM* 
The excessive demand for universities in metropolitan areas as a result 
of location premiums and regulated admissions quotas diminishes the 
competition between universities and the incentive to enhance 
educational performance to attract more students. Cases in point are 
the lower graduate employment rates (a measure of educational 
performance) of universities in metropolitan areas compared to those 
in non-metropolitan areas despite higher quality students. Additionally, 
the graduate employment rates of non-metropolitan universities are 
influenced by educational input factors such as an increase in the 
percentage of courses taught by full-time faculty, while those of 
metropolitan universities are contingent merely on enrollees’ entrance 
scores. Ergo, a structure that revitalizes the competition between 
universities and encourages them to improve their educational 
services must be established in order to enhance the quality of higher 
education. 
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University Restructuring 
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   I. Introduction 
 
n 1996, the Korean government adopted a normative system of institutional 
establishment with the goals of authorizing the establishment of a university 
upon the satisfaction of predetermined requirements and of recognizing its legal 
personality status simply through registration without additional administrative 
procedures such as government approval or permission — termed a ‘normative 
system’ in this paper. Since the adoption of the system, universities in Korea have 
expanded rapidly in size. However, this has been under fire in that quality 
improvements in education have not been guaranteed. The quantitative expansion 
of higher education clearly has positive outcomes, such as mass accessibility and
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equal opportunities in higher education, but these are by far outnumbered by the 
negative consequences, mainly more underperforming universities that fail to 
recruit enough faculty members and students to fulfill their capacities, according to 
critics. Social costs incurred by these underperformers lingering in the market are 
considered to be significant. Furthermore, looming changes in Korea’s 
demographic structure are expected to accelerate the decline in the school-age 
population, likely leaving many universities with difficulties in recruiting enough 
students to stay afloat by around 2030. 
In its master plan for the development of higher education released in August of 
2013, the Ministry of Education announced the abolition of the normative system, 
entering into effect in 2014, meaning that the establishment of universities will 
become more difficult. This plan, however, would not help at all to solve the 
ongoing problems of underperforming universities. As the school-age population 
decreases, the number of prospective undergraduates is as well on the decline as 
well, allowing a projection of the excess supply of higher education. For example, 
given that private universities accounting for 80 percent of all higher education 
institutions rely mainly on student tuition payments to operate, if current conditions 
persist, there will be more underperforming universities as a result of the decline in 
the number of students. 
The Korean government now faces two challenges: to enhance the 
competitiveness of universities and to cope with the decline in the school-age 
population. It would be reasonable to view these two issues as not mutually 
exclusive and to consider that they could be explored simultaneously. As an 
example, consider three universities, A, B and C, each able to admit one hundred 
students, in a society with a school-age population of three hundred. Assuming no 
increase in their admissions capacities, a rise in the school-age population would 
result in fierce competition among students, but none among these universities 
because regardless of their academic achievements, it is simply impossible to 
attract more students. On the other hand, assuming that the school-age population 
decreases by ∆ per year from three hundred, this would cause the universities to 
compete for students. In this regard, unlike an increase in the school-age 
population, a decrease would introduce the natural pressure of competition among 
universities, implying that efforts to resolve the decrease in the school-age 
population, as long as they do not hinder competition among universities, would be 
compatible with the policy goal of strengthening their competitiveness. More 
fundamental methods to enhance competitiveness are needed, as the competition 
pressure brought by the decline in the school-age population may be short-lived. 
Government policies affecting higher education have thus far focused on control 
through fiscal support using multi-faceted regulations. This has partly contributed 
to complacency by universities, leaning towards satisfaction with the given 
conditions instead of taking a leap forward. Therefore, this study seeks measures to 
enhance the competitiveness of Korean universities and to respond to the decline in 
the school-age population. To this end, this paper initially outlines academic 
achievements by Korean universities and then reviews two fundamental regulations 
pertaining to Korean universities: university establishment regulations in the 
capital area, and the normative system currently in place. The findings on Korean 
universities are then analyzed in an effort to examine their implications and to 
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consider the possibility of the adoption of quasi-market competition. In particular, 
this paper makes assumptions about the academic achievements by universities in 
the capital and in non-capital areas and tests them, based on which it intends to 
analyze problems of current university restructuring policies and then suggest 
solutions. 
 
II. Current Status of Korean Universities 
 
A. Higher Education Achievements 
 
What it takes for Korea to be at the center of the Asian economy and culture 
overall is talented human capital with creative and innovative minds and with the 
capabilities to realize value-added results in knowledge-intensive sectors. Over the 
past fifty years, universities in Korea have grown substantially in terms of size, but 
not in terms of their global competitiveness. According to the IMD’s World 
Competitiveness Yearbook for 2013, Korea ranks twenty-fifth in educational 
competitiveness out of sixty nations, following Sweden (1st), Denmark (2nd), Israel 
(11th) and Taiwan (21st), as shown in Table 1. 
Meanwhile, approximately 2.6 persons per 1,000 Koreans are now studying 
abroad for higher education, placing Korea at eleventh on this list. On the other 
hand, Korea ranks among the lowest (41st) in terms of university education; its 
highest ranking in this category was thirty-ninth out of 59 nations in 2011, 
changing only slightly since 2009. Despite its high rate of university enrollment, 
Korean universities show low employment rates for graduates and only modest 
educational achievements. Hence, it is necessary to determine the fundamental 
reasons for the current conditions and to develop measures which will lead to 
institutional improvements. 
Table 1 shows Korea that ranks approximately fiftieth in terms of the number of 
students per teacher at primary and secondary schools, at 20 and 18 students, 
respectively, whereas it is typically eighth to tenth in terms of the secondary school 
enrollment rate, which stands at 96 percent. Korean students typically rank fourth 
or fifth in math and science on the PISA test. These outstanding achievements can 
be understood as the outcome of parents’ much larger investments in private 
education compared to the levels of public investment in primary and secondary 
education. Also, Korea ranks second in terms of the higher education completion 
rate for the population aged 25~34, at 65 percent. On the other hand, as of 2013, 
Korea ranks twenty-seventh, forty-first and forty-first again in terms of educational 
system, university education, and management education, thus showing 
backwardness. The simultaneous presence of a large number of Korean students 
studying abroad and the low level of university education together imply that it is 
the low quality of domestic university education that motivates many students to 
choose to study abroad. 
Korea’s gross tertiary enrollment rate1 is among the highest, as shown in Table 2,  
 
1Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group 
that officially corresponds to the level of education shown, tertiary education, according to the UNESCO Institute 
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TABLE 1— CHANGES IN KOREA’S EDUCATION COMPETITIVENESS BY SUB-INDEX (2009~13):  
RANKINGS AND SCORES 
Detailed indicators of education competitiveness 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Korea’s ranking/Number of participating nations 36/57 35/58 29/59 31/59 25/60 
Quantity 1. Education-related public spending as a percentage of 
GDP (%) 
36 
(4.2)
36 
(4.2)
33 
(4.6)
31 
(4.6) 
32 
(4.63) 
2. Education-related public expenditure per person US$)1) 27 
(831)
29 
(916)
32 
(793)
31 
(785) 
33 
(785) 
3. Number of students per teacher in elementary schools 
(umber) 
51 
(26.7)
51 
(25.6)
51 
(24.1)
50 
(22.4) 
51 
(20.9) 
4. Number of students per teacher in secondary schools 
(umber) 
50 
(18.0)
51 
(18.1)
53 
(18.2)
53 
(18.0) 
52 
(17.6) 
5. Secondary school enrollment rate (%) 6 
(96.1)
8 
(96.5)
6 
(98.0)
8 
(95.7) 
10 
(96.0) 
6. Higher education completion rate for the population aged 
25~34 (%) 
4 
(53.0)
2 
(56.0)
2 
(58.0)
2 
(63.0) 
2 
(65.0) 
7. Number of foreign students studying in higher education 
in Korea per 1,000 population (number) 
37 
(0.46)
34 
(0.66)
33 
(0.83)
34 
(1.02) 
32 
(1.20) 
8. Number of Korean students studying abroad for higher 
education per 1,000 population1) (number) 
10 
(2.11)
11 
(2.17)
11 
(2.32)
11 
(2.54) 
11 
(2.56) 
9. Scholastic achievement 2), 3) 
Total 4 4 5 5 5 
Math (PISA score) 4  
(547)
4  
(547)
4  
(546)
4  
(546) 
4  
(546) 
Science (PISA score) 10 
(522)
10 
(522)
6  
(538)
6  
(538) 
6  
(538) 
10. English proficiency (TOEFL score)2), 4) 48 
(77)
48 
 (78)
46 
(81)
46  
(81) 
46  
(82) 
11. Illiteracy rate of population aged 15 and older (%) 32 
(2.0)
32 
(1.7)
33 
(1.7)
34 
(1.7) 
34 
(1.7) 
Quality 12. Educational system 32 
(4.38)
31 
(5.03)
20 
(6.00)
27 
(5.58) 
27 
(5.71) 
13. Science education5) - 32 (4.96)
20 
(5.37)
37 
(4.57) 
23 
(5.32) 
14. University education 51 
(3.95)
46 
(4.28)
39 
(5.00)
42 
(4.57) 
41 
(4.93) 
15. Management education 42 
(4.52)
43 
(4.70)
35 
(5.41)
43 
(4.95) 
41 
(5.19) 
16. Linguistic ability 34 
(4.88)
39 
(4.98)
31 
(5.60)
32 
(5.59) 
28 
(5.88) 
Note: 1) Not used for the ranking calculation; this is only reference information used to check the backgrounds of 
the subject nations. 2) Used as background information until 2008. Incorporated into the quantitative index from 
2009 to 2012 and then categorized as background information from 2013. The rankings and scores are based on 
the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook and are therefore partly inconsistent with those published in PISA 
2009. 3) Scores from 2009 to 2010 come from PISA 2006, and those from 2011 to 2013 come from PISA 2009. 4) 
The TOEFL test changed from CBT (scores of 0~300) to iBT (scores of 0~120); hence, the rankings from 2009 are 
calculated based on the iBT. A score of 218 on the CBT scale is equivalent to a score of 81~82 on the iBT scale. 5) 
One of the sub-indices of the science infrastructure before 2010, when it was incorporated into the sub-indices for 
education competitiveness 6) * −: Scores and rankings are not released. Figures in * (  ) are indicator values. 
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (Various years). Recitation of the KEDI (2013).  
 
  
 
for Statistics. 
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TABLE 2—WEF’S EDUCATION RANKINGS 
(UNIT: RANK) 
Category 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Higher 
education and 
vocational 
training 
Total higher education enrollment rate  1  1  1  1  1 
Quality of the educational system 47 57 55 44 64 
Quality of universities /graduate schools of business 44 47 50 42 56 
Corporate 
innovation University-industry research collaboration 24 23 25 25 26 
Note: 1) The number of surveyed nations varies, with 133 in 2009, 139 in 2010, 142 in 2011, 144 in 2012 and 148 
in 2013. 2) According to the WEF’s 2013 report on the secondary enrollment rate, Korea ranked 27th among 148 
nations as of 2010. 
Source: World Economic Forum (Various years). 
 
 
TABLE 3—PROPORTION OF ENROLLED STUDENTS BY UNIVERSITY TYPE (2011) 
(UNIT: %) 
Category Public Government-dependent private Independent/Private 
Australia 96  4 
Austria 84  13  3 
Finland 74  26
France 86   5  9 
Germany 96   4
Italy 90 10 
Japan 25 75 
South Korea 23 77 
Mexico 67 33 
Norway 85   5 10 
Poland 90 10 
Spain 88 12 
Switzerland 93   7
Turkey 94  6 
UK 100
US 70 30 
Source: OECD (2013. 
 
whereas the quality levels of its educational system and its management courses at 
universities and graduate schools are among the lowest (44th~64th and 42nd~56th, 
respectively). In the category of university-industry research collaboration, Korea 
ranks twenty-third to twenty-sixth and therefore shows a low level in this regard 
considering its economic power. 
Contrary to the popular belief that the private sector-led supply of higher 
education would result an undersupply due to external effects, private universities 
outnumber national and public universities by almost fourfold in Korea, as shown 
in Table 3. In most nations, public universities account for 70~90 percent of all 
universities, with the exception of Korea and Japan, where only 23 percent and 25 
percent, respectively, are publicly operated. 
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TABLE 4—EMPLOYMENT RATES BY AREA, STUDY FIELD, UNIVERSITY TYPE AND GENDER (2012) 
(UNIT: %) 
Category Total National/Public Private 
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Total 56.2 60.1 52.1 53.4 59.1 45.5 56.9 60.4 53.5 
Capital 
area 
Subtotal 56.7 62.8 50.9 59.7 64.5 51.9 56.5 62.6 50.8 
Humanities 50.0 55.2 47.9 51.0 52.9 49.6 50.0 56.3 47.8 
Social Sciences 56.4 59.0 53.8 62.7 66.6 56.0 56.0 58.4 53.7 
Education 45.9 44.1 46.7 47.3 47.3 47.3 45.8 43.7 46.7 
Engineering 71.0 73.4 62.8 70.2 72.6 61.0 71.0 73.5 62.9 
Natural 
Sciences 51.1 55.7 48.2 51.7 54.5 48.4 51.0 56.8 48.2 
Medical Sciences 
& Pharmacy 75.8 81.3 73.1 84.2 88.7 79.8 75.4 80.7 72.9 
Arts & Physical 
Education 39.1 43.2 37.2 42.3 49.2 35.4 38.9 42.5 37.3 
Non-
capital 
area 
Subtotal 55.8 58.5 52.9 52.7 58.4 44.8 57.2 58.5 55.9 
Humanities 47.1 48.0 46.6 39.8 43.9 37.8 49.7 49.5 49.8 
Social Sciences 53.2 52.8 53.5 48.3 50.4 45.8 54.5 53.6 55.6 
Education 50.2 47.4 51.5 32.7 37.3 29.6 60.4 56.8 62.4 
Engineering 65.4 66.2 61.3 66.9 67.2 59.2 64.9 66.3 63.0 
Natural 
Sciences 52.8 54.9 51.1 50.2 53.8 46.9 55.4 56.1 54.9 
Medical Sciences 
& Pharmacy 73.9 79.2 71.1 66.7 77.8 64.4 74.7 79.5 72.2 
Arts & Physical 
Education 47.7 53.0 44.3 38.3 48.8 33.2 49.3 53.6 46.4 
 
Note: 1) Employment rate (as of 2012) = {employees with workplace-based health insurance + graduates 
employed on campus + overseas employees + employed persons in farming business/persons eligible for 
employment} ⅹ 100 2) The employed (as of 2012) include those with workplace-based health insurance, 
graduates employed on campus, overseas employees and persons employed in farming businesses. 3) Graduates 
employed on campus (as of 2012) refer to those with workplace-based health insurance, as of the date of the 
survey, who signed a contract exceeding one year with a university foundation or a relevant institution (industry-
academic cooperation foundation, university or corporate) and who are paid more than the minimum wage; the 
annual salary of a person employed at the per-hour minimum wage of 4,580 won (as of 2012) is 957,220 won. 4) 
Overseas employees refer to those who work for more than 15 hours per week and who have an employment 
contract which exceeds 91 days. 5) Persons employed in farming businesses refer to those without workplace-
based health insurance working in farming businesses as of the date of the survey. 6) Persons eligible for 
employment (according to the 2012 guideline): Graduates — persons (who are advancing into higher education, 
undertaking their mandatory military service, unable to work, officially excluded and foreign students) 7) Persons 
who are unable to work refer to those who are inmates, dead, those who emigrate overseas and those hospitalized 
for more than six months. 8) Persons who are deemed officially excluded refer to those who are medical aid 
recipients, graduates with a degree from a religious leader training course, female military officers attending a 
training course before being officially commissioned, and persons eligible for education courses provided by 
professional education institutes for aviation workers. 
Source: KEDI(Korean Educational Development Institute), Employment Statistics DB. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the employment rate of university graduates is 56.2 percent 
for the year 2012. It should be noted that these figures may be overestimated, as 
they include the number of graduates employed on campus. Universities 
occasionally do this in order to raise the employment rates of their graduates. The 
employment rate of university graduates in the capital area is 56.7 percent, not very 
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different from the rate of 55.8 percent in non-capital area. However, the gap 
between the two widens sharply with regard to the employment rate according to 
field of study. This implies that universities have made sufficient efforts, such as 
adjusting the admission capacity of each study field or creating market demand for 
a particular field of study, even considering the fact that the market demand for 
different fields of study can vary. For instance, universities may have attempted to 
raise the total employment rate by expanding the capacity for medical sciences and 
pharmacy while decreasing capacity for less popular fields of study. 
 
B. Current Regulations 
 
1. Regulations Affecting Capital-Area Universities 
 
Pursuant to the policy intending to control the increasing population in the 
capital area, the Korean government enacted the Seoul Metropolitan Area 
Readjustment Planning Act in 1984 and strengthened regulatory policies regarding 
the establishment and expansion of large-scale enterprises, universities (four-year, 
in particular) and public institutions. The central government’s policy to curb the 
concentration in the capital area is largely an attempt to discourage behavior itself 
through the Act and to restructure zones and spaces through readjustment plans. 
Laws which sought total quantity control over the admissions capacities of 
universities were adopted in 1994 in order to control the total number of 
prospective students at universities in the capital area. Given that the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area Readjustment Planning Act entered into effect in 1984, 
regulations pertaining to the establishment of universities in the capital area have 
been guided by the principle of no establishment or expansion of universities, 
particularly in Seoul, with some exceptions, as shown in Table 5. 
The consequences of these regulations are illustrated in Figures 1~4 using data 
concerning changes in the number of universities and registered students in the 
capital and non-capital areas. 
The number of universities remains constant until 1979 and then shows a 
sustained increase in non-capital areas starting in 1980. After the adoption of the 
normative system in 1997, the numbers of universities in Seoul and in the capital 
area remain relatively stable, whereas for non-capital areas, it continues to rise. 
A similar pattern is observed with regard to the number of registered students. 
The number of undergraduates shows little change until 1979, with a sharp rise in 
both capital and non-capital areas starting in 1982 with the adoption of the 
graduation capacity system. After the system was abolished in 1987, the number 
remains steady until 1996. After the adoption of the normative system in 1997, the 
numbers of undergraduates in both Seoul and the capital area climb slightly, 
whereas the numbers of students in non-capital areas increase rapidly. 
The ratio of universities in the capital to those in non-capital areas remains close 
to 6:4 until 1979, but it reversed to 4:6 by 2003 as the proportion of universities in 
the capital region decreased continuously after 1979. 
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TABLE 5—CHANGES IN SCHOOL REGULATIONS IN THE CAPITAL AREA 
Date of 
revision Scope of schools 
Description of regulations affecting  
the relocation promotion zone (Seoul) 
Oct. 20, 
1983 
High school and higher education - Ban on establishing or expanding school and academic 
courses and raising admissions capacities 
․ Allow the construction of new facilities requested by 
junior colleges or higher educational institutions within 
the minimum scope stipulated in the Decree on Standards 
for School Facilities. 
Oct. 10, 
1985 
Universities, teachers’ colleges, 
colleges of education at 
universities, air and 
correspondence colleges, open 
universities and junior colleges 
(or various types of schools) 
- Ban on establishing or expanding schools and/or raising 
admissions capacities (except for night courses) 
․ Allow the construction of new facilities requested by 
junior colleges or higher educational institutions within 
the minimum scope stipulated in the Decree on Standards 
for School Facilities. 
․ Allow the construction of new facilities at the Korea 
Aerospace University. 
Dec. 24, 
1988 
Same as above - Ban on establishing or expanding schools and raising 
admissions capacities (except for night courses) 
․ Allow the construction of new facilities requested by 
junior colleges or higher educational institutions within 
the minimum scope stipulated in the Decree on Standards 
for School Facilities. 
Dec. 23, 
1989 
Same as above  
(except for air and 
correspondence colleges) 
- Ban on establishing or expanding schools and raising 
admissions capacities (except for night courses) 
․ Allow the construction of new facilities requested by 
junior colleges or higher educational institutions within 
the minimum scope stipulated in the Decree on Standards 
for School Facilities. 
․ Allow the establishment of new religious schools when 
the head of the Ministry of Education, in consultation with 
the head of the Ministry of Construction, deem it 
necessary to foster educators. 
․ Allow the establishment of a junior college in a non-Seoul 
area. 
Dec. 31, 
1992 
Same as above (Same as above) 
- Allow the expansion of admissions capacities in the fields of 
advanced science and engineering by 1995 (under review). 
※ Allow the establishment of small-scale colleges 
(in zones designated for reserved development and 
environmental preservation). 
Feb. 20, 
1993 
Same as above - Allow the establishment of the Korea National University of 
Arts.  
Apr. 30, 
1994 
Same as above - Ban on establishing or expanding schools  
- Allow the establishment of junior and open colleges in non-
Seoul areas (under review). 
- Adopt a total quantity control scheme pertaining to 
admissions capacities 
※ Allow the establishment of small-scale colleges 
(in zones designated for growth management and 
environmental preservation) 
Source: GRI(Gyeanggi Research Institute) (2008). 
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Source: Ministry of Education (1965~2013).  
 
FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF UNIVERSITIES 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Education (1965~2013). 
 
FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED AT UNIVERSITIES 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Education (1965~2013). 
 
FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF UNIVERSITIES IN THE CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL AREAS 
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Source: Ministry of Education (1965~2013). 
  
FIGURE 4. NUMBER OF ENROLLED STUDENTS IN THE CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL AREAS 
 
 
The ratio of enrolled students in the capital and non-capital areas remains close 
to 7:3 until 1972, but the gradual decrease in the proportion of those in the capital 
area reverses the ratio to 4:6, where it has remained since approximately 1990. 
 
2. Normative System of University Establishment 
 
By initiating the May 31st agenda for educational reform in 1995, the 
government sought to shift the paradigm of Korea’s higher education policy. The 
main goals of this reform encompass the creation of a normative system and 
university autonomy when setting admissions capacities. Some have been critical, 
stating that since the reform, Korea’s higher education system has grown overly 
large. 
 
The following summarizes the reform policy for universities (Presidential 
Committee on Education Innovation, 2006a): 
① More diversity and specialty: to develop a variety of university models and 
to adopt a (independent) specialized graduate school system 
② Autonomy of the university establishment process, admissions capacity and 
academic operations: normative system and university autonomy for 
admissions capacity 
③ Upgrade Korea’s academic research to the world’s best standards: to 
upgrade the research at universities to world-class levels, with financial 
assistance tied to evaluation results 
④ Globalized education at universities: to foster professionals in international 
relations and to attract more foreign students and to promote the 
establishment of overseas campuses 
 
Relaxation of regulation regarding the establishment of universities was 
embodied into the ‘normative system’ and the ‘(independent) specialized graduate 
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school system’ — which runs no bachelor’s degree programs — while regulations 
affecting admissions capacities were phased into a policy of ‘autonomy of 
admissions capacity.’ 
 
III. Main Issues 
 
A. Regulations on University Establishment in  
the Capital Area and Admissions Capacities 
 
Regulations on private universities in the capital area, mainly their admissions 
capacities and the establishment of these institutions, have made universities more 
dependent on non-tuition resources, such as financial assistance from the 
government. In fact, there is little room for universities to make investments in 
quality educational services. Meanwhile, those in the capital area make no extra 
efforts to recruit students, as there are no new universities to challenge them. 
 
 
TABLE 6—STUDENT ENROLLMENT RATE 
Category Observed value Average Standard deviation 
2011 
Non-capital  90  94.33 18.04 
Capital  62 111.25 17.93 
2012 
Non-capital  91  91.38 25.69 
Capital  62 110.95 23.16 
2013 
Non-capital  91  95.36 20.80 
Capital  62 112.83 18.74 
Three-year total 
Non-capital 272  93.69 21.74 
Capital 186 111.67 21.74 
Source: Data from the Higher Education in Korea (http://www.academyinfo.go.kr), reprocessed. 
 
TABLE 7—GOVERNMENT SUPPORT  
(CENTRAL GOVERNMENT + LOCAL AUTHORITY) 
Category Observed value Average  (1m won) 
Standard deviation 
(1m won) 
2011 
Non-capital  75  7,617 11,671 
Capital  47 16,954 27,963 
2012 
Non-capital  82 10,834 23,771 
Capital  56 18,381 31,564 
2013 
Non-capital  80  9,240 13,627 
Capital  52 24,120 51,161 
Three-year total 
Non-capital 237  9,278 17,336 
Capital 155 19,873 38,284 
Source: Data from the Higher Education in Korea (http://www.academyinfo.go.kr), reprocessed. 
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TABLE 8—GOVERNMENT SUPPORT  
(CENTRAL GOVERNMENT + LOCAL AUTHORITY,  
PER ENROLLED STUDENT (BELOW AND ABOVE CAPACITY)) 
Category Observed value Average  (1k won) 
Standard deviation 
(1k won) 
2011 Non-capital 75 1,348 3,901 
Capital 47 1,455 1,791 
2012 Non-capital 82 2,863 15,352 
Capital 56 1,626 1,982 
2013 Non-capital 80 1,794 6,361 
Capital 52 2,113 3,348 
Three-year total Non-capital 237 2,023 9,981 
Capital 155 1,737 2,480 
Source: Data from the Higher Education in Korea (http://www.academyinfo.go.kr), reprocessed. 
 
TABLE 9—PROPORTION OF GOVERNMENT GRANT FUNDS OUT OF TOTAL SCHOOL REVENUES (%) 
(PROPORTION OF GOVERNMENT GRANT FUNDS OUT OF EDUCATIONAL REVENUES) 
(UNIT: %) 
Classification Observed value Average (%) Standard deviation 
2011 
Non-capital  91 5.06 3.53 
Capital  62 2.59 1.80 
2012 
Non-capital  91 5.22 3.86 
Capital  62 2.74 1.80 
2013 
Non-capital  90 9.95 4.40 
Capital  62 6.99 2.91 
Three-year total 
Non-capital 272 6.73 4.54 
Capital 186 4.11 3.02 
Source: Data from the Higher Education in Korea (http://www.academyinfo.go.kr), reprocessed. 
 
Capital-area universities receiving admission applications which exceed their 
capacities and making no new investment results in little change in university 
rankings; universities have little incentive to make new efforts or to increase their 
investments. 
Moreover, universities in the capital area are given government support in 
amounts which are two to three times greater than the support given to universities 
in non-capital areas. Such a difference in government support, however, is not as 
large as it first appears given the fact that in terms of per-student support, 
universities in the capital region are given only 1.2 times more support than those 
in non-capital areas. This can be interpreted to mean that government support is 
nearly balanced between universities in the capital and those in non-capital areas. 
With regard to private universities in non-capital areas, they cannot compete 
with their counterparts in the capital area without active investment from a major 
corporation or foundation. Of course, this does not mean that private universities in 
non-capital areas have not competed with each other for students. Compared to 
their counterparts in the capital area, they are not less dependent on non-tuition 
revenues, leaving them more dependent on financial support from the government. 
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In addition, because they do not have access to the advantages available in the 
capital area, they are in a lower position with regard to their university rankings 
and therefore have difficulty recruiting students and hence excellent faculty 
members as well. Inevitably, the quality of their educational services cannot reach 
high levels. 
Universities in the capital area are subject to the admission capacity regulation, 
unlike their counterparts in non-capital areas. When asking whether this regulation 
resolves the market distortion brought by the location premium by which 
inefficient universities are sustained without extra effort simply because they are 
located in the capital area, the answer may in fact be negative, as discussed below. 
First, the number of registered students in the capital and non-capital areas has 
changed little since 1984, when the establishment regulation was adopted Figure 4. 
The fact that the proportion of registered students in the capital area against those 
in non-capital areas was decreasing before the adoption of the regulation implies 
that university autonomy with regard to admission capacity serves to reduce 
inefficiency. Moreover, few universities in the capital area have been dissolved thus 
far despite the efforts of the government, implying that the establishment regulation 
fails to eliminate the underlying market distortion. Second, the establishment 
regulation has made universities more dependent on governmental fiscal support so 
as to make up for the decrease in their tuition revenues and engage in inefficient 
activities such as launching campuses in non-capital areas. Even after setting aside 
the dependence on government support, several top-ranking private universities in 
the capital area appear to have obtained a cross-subsidy from their local campuses. 
More importantly, the establishment regulation itself seems to have an adverse 
effect of mitigating competition pressure on capital-area universities, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. Taken all together, it can be said that the underlying 
inefficiency caused by the location premium cannot be resolved by the 
government’s establishment regulation. Because it causes other inefficiencies, such 
as reduced competitiveness and cross-subsidies through local campuses, putting an 
end to this regulation should be considered. 
 
B. University Restructuring Policy 
 
The 2013 master plan for the development of higher education (Oct. 1, 2013) 
contains the basic directions for university structural reforms and evaluation 
systems and suggests policy agendas for building the basis to sharpen 
competitiveness, strengthen industry-academy collaboration and lifelong education, 
reinforce research capacities, and create innovative university education programs. 
The Ministry of Education then released the “Action Plan for University Structural 
Reform” (hereinafter, the action plan) on Jan. 29, 2014, which sought to upgrade 
the quality of university education and to prepare for a rapid decline in the school-
age population. The action plan is mainly designed to carry out performance 
evaluations of all universities and to determine the reductions in the admissions 
capacities according to the evaluation results. 
The main objective of this plan is to develop a proactive and aggressive reform 
measure for restructuring so as to enhance the competitiveness of universities by    
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TABLE 10—CAPACITY REDUCTION TARGETS PER CYCLE (PROVISIONAL) 
Evaluation cycle First cycle 
(2014~2016) 
Second cycle 
(2017~2019) 
Third cycle 
(2020~2022) 
Reduction target 40,000 50,000 70,000 
Period  
(Academic year basis) 2015~2017 2018~2020 2021~2023 
Source: Ministry of Education (January 28th, 2014). 
 
significantly reducing the numbers of universities and by upgrading their 
educational quality levels. All universities, except for those rated as excellent, will 
be subject to capacity reductions, and new systems for specialized universities and 
evaluations are to be adopted with legal and institutional foundations for consistent 
and systemic structural reforms established. Given these basic directions, the action 
plan includes the following detailed tasks. 
First, based on the results of the performance evaluations, capacity reduction 
plans will be implemented with a target of 40,000 by 2017 and 160,000 in total by 
2023, reflecting the number of prospective students after 2014 and the expected 
increase in the school-age population after 2025. The (provisional) targets 
pertaining to the amount of the reduction per cycle are shown in Table 10. All 
universities will be evaluated during every cycle. Based on the evaluation results, 
all universities except for those rated as excellent will be subject to differentiated 
capacity reductions, and those rated as excellent will also be encouraged 
voluntarily to reduce their capacities through government-funded projects, with the 
ends results (performance outcomes) of the structural reforms reflected in the 
evaluations of all government-funded projects and detailed methods to enact the 
structural reforms suggested in the respective project action plans. 
Second, a new university evaluation system will be adopted to improve the 
quality of education. This is primarily intended to expand the qualitative evaluation 
part in the existing quantitative evaluation in order to develop an evaluation system 
for university structural reforms. Therefore, absolute evaluations of all universities 
will be conducted, and they will all be given five grades according to the results. 
The evaluations, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, cover all areas 
ranging from the overall management and operation to the curriculum, and they 
consist of common and specialized indicators. Four-year universities and two-year 
colleges are subject to different sets of evaluation indicators, while national, public 
and private universities are subject to the same indicators. The measures for 
structural reform according to the grade are shown in Table 11. 
Third, to build legal and institutional foundations for sustainable structural 
reform, the action plan aims to formulate an enforcement system and relevant laws. 
The process of realizing an enforcement system includes the establishment of a 
committee for university structural reforms and the establishment of a non-standing 
evaluation task force and a university council attended by approximately 400~500 
personnel, including incumbent and former professors and industry leaders. 
Relevant laws mainly concern the legislation of the (provisional) “Act on 
University Structural Reform and Evaluation,” as a means of implementing 
structural reforms such as capacity reductions and as a means of developing    
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TABLE 11—STRUCTURAL REFORM MEASURES: FIVE-LEVEL GRADES 
Grade Structural reform measures 
Excellent • Voluntary capacity reduction, participation in government-funded projects 
Good • Partial capacity reduction, participation in government-funded projects 
Average • Average capacity reduction, participation in government-funded projects 
Poor • A higher-than-average capacity reduction, unqualified for participation in government-funded 
projects, unqualified for the National Scholarship II, partial restrictions on student loans 
Very poor • A sharp capacity reduction, unqualified for participation in government-funded projects, 
unqualified for the National Scholarships I and II, full restrictions on student loans, induction 
of voluntary closure 
Note: 1) A university rated “very poor” two times consecutively will be forced to close. 2) National Scholarship I: 
Differentiated support in connection with income. National Scholarship II: Support in connection with the 
university’s independent efforts (reducing tuitions, expanding scholarships)  
Source: Ministry of Education (January 28th, 2014). 
 
a channel for the voluntary dissolution of private universities according to the 
results of their evaluations. 
To recap, the government’s university restructuring policy intends to implement 
differentiated reductions of admissions capacities at all universities according to 
their respective evaluation results. With regard to the goal of strengthening 
university competitiveness, it would be reasonable to allow universities deemed 
more efficient to continue to provide educational services while closing those 
which are deemed inefficient. The government currently pursues policy measures 
that aim at differentiated reductions in admissions capacities based on the results of 
university evaluations. It is doubtful, however, that these evaluations can in fact 
lead to the intended outcome. Regardless of the strictness of the evaluations, it will 
be challenging to force out a university unless its illegality is clear and certain. The 
Ministry of Education, not immune from political pressure, is most likely to 
conclude almost all universities are average in terms of quality. If this is the case, 
the restructuring policy will mean an average cut in the admissions capacities at all 
universities, implying that even inefficient institutions will continue to provide 
educational services. This may be a problem. In other words, any evaluation 
lacking a market assessment based on students’ choices — assuming all students 
are provided with accurate information — would only show ‘average in quality.’ 
This may cause eventual delays in the restructuring process, a possibility that 
should not be taken lightly. 
 
C. University Reform Experiences of  
Advanced Economies and Lessons for Korea 
 
The university reform experiences of the US and of European countries have 
many implications for Korea, which is now under the pressure of restructuring and 
of realizing higher competitiveness at its universities due to the decline in the 
school-age population. By the mid-1980s, universities in Europe were managed by 
academic self-governance and strict government regulations and control efforts; 
i.e., they were subject to several government regulations. Afterwards, new public 
management initiatives were introduced with an emphasis on less government 
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control and more quasi-market elements, based on the expectation that universities 
with more autonomy over their internal resource allocation and management 
systems would be more likely to realize management efficiency levels through 
competition. 
Schimank (2007) describes a new type of university governance structure with 
the following characteristics: high competition, low academic self-governance, 
high stakeholder guidance, low state regulation levels, and high managerial self-
governance. 
Meanwhile, Aghion et al. (2009) analyzed the impacts of the university 
governance structure on the research outputs as measured according to the number 
of patents and the global university research ranking. Their analysis shows a 
positive correlation between institutional autonomy and competition at public 
universities in the US and Europe and their research outputs. When given 
additional financial support, public universities produce more patents in fierce 
competition with private research universities, which enjoy greater autonomy 
levels. The quasi-market competition for research funding and for students serves 
as a foundation for the success of US university departments (Aghion et al. 2009). 
Schneider and Sadowski (2010) analyzed data pertaining to the employment of 
doctoral graduates in economics for 2001 and 2002 from 14 universities at 
Germany and other European countries. According to their analysis, the major 
characteristics of successful departments are transparency of their academic 
achievements, no governmental or university regulations, and research funding that 
is allocated through performance competition. On the other hand, unsuccessful 
departments are found to lack transparency of their academic achievements, to be 
under the control of university regulations, and to be given research funding that 
disregards performance competition. 
To summarize, university reforms in advanced economies are moving towards 
granting more autonomy to universities. This is particularly impressive considering 
that Germany and many other European countries — where universities were 
mostly state-run in the past — have made efforts to step away from excessive 
control (using government support as a means) and to respect the autonomy of 
universities. Behind these changes is a shift in consciousness: autonomy shall act to 
encourage inter-university competition and hence have maximum effectiveness. 
Aghion et al. (2009) show that in the US, with several of the world’s leading 
universities, the maximum effectiveness stemming from competition between 
private universities with greater autonomy is the driving force behind 
competitiveness by public universities. This offers significant implications to 
Korean policies regarding universities. 
In Korea, due to the area-based regulations, particularly admissions capacity 
control regulations, universities have provided overall low-quality educational 
services and have shown weak responsiveness towards social needs; the relevant 
theoretical assumptions and tests are described in Chapter 4 and 5, respectively. 
Therefore, the government’s planned restructuring policy, with differentiated fiscal 
support for admissions capacity reductions, could only lead to more inefficiency 
and even a paradoxical situation of a delay in university restructuring. This policy 
is, in other words, to impose admissions capacity control on universities in non-
capital areas, where admissions capacities have not been regulated thus far, 
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meaning that the adoption of the policy itself could generate inefficiency. 
Universities with low student recruitment rates and hence room for admissions 
capacity reductions will experience little impact and even be given an incentive to 
seek fiscal support through a capacity reduction. On the other hand, reducing the 
admissions capacities at universities with high student recruitment rates would 
result in decreased opportunities for students. As universities that should be closed 
come to rely more on fiscal support, the market for university education would 
experience higher inefficiency at more universities. This is the consequence that 
the current restructuring policy is most likely to generate. This policy therefore 
needs to be reconsidered.  
The crucial point of a restructuring policy lies in the choice between imposing 
overall admissions capacity control — as in the current policy — and forcing out 
those universities ranked at the bottom under a goal of university autonomy over 
admissions capacity. Simply put, this is a matter of admissions capacity control by 
the government or by universities themselves. Theoretical and empirical analyses 
concerning this are described in the following chapter. 
 
IV. Hypotheses and Tests 
 
At present, universities in the capital area are subject to government regulations 
on their admissions capacities, whereas those in non-capital areas have autonomy 
in setting their own policies. This chapter discusses the consequences of 
equilibrium behavior at universities under the current regulations, after which 
hypotheses that could be tested using data are introduced. 
 
A. Analysis of Equilibrium Behavior According to  
Admissions Capacity Regulation 
 
For analytic convenience, we assume the followings: 1) there are three 
universities in a society: A, B and C; 2) each provide educational services, the 
quality levels of which are identical in the early stage — providing better 
educational services requires increased effort and costs by each university; 3) there 
is no information asymmetry between students and universities with regard to the 
educational service; 4) other physical conditions, such as dormitory and lecture 
rooms, are all identical; and 5) they are all subject to the same government 
regulations affecting tuition fees, and they earn nothing other than tuition revenues 
— meaning that the educational service is a single subject focused on by the 
universities. This section investigates the equilibrium behaviors of universities 
under these assumptions when their admissions capacities are controlled and when 
they are not controlled. Each scenario is again examined by applying the two cases 
of a sufficient number of students and an insufficient number. 
For explanatory convenience, each university has an admissions capacity of 100 
students, which here is below the optimal level in terms of the cost structure of the 
university. The supply of students is assumed to be 300+∆ (∆ > 0), and all three 
universities provide educational services of the same quality; i.e., which university 
a student attends is irrelevant (a random choice scenario). In addition, for each 
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university, there are no incentives to upgrade their educational quality, as there is 
no way for them to recruit more students and to increase their capacity. This leaves 
students competing to be included in the total admissions capacity of 300 students. 
Under this condition, what would happen to the quality of the educational 
services provided by these universities? The optimal choice for the universities 
would be to provide educational services in which there is no discrimination 
between university graduates and high school graduates, taking into account the 
time and money invested by each high school graduate in order to complete their 
university courses, which would be the baseline for comparison in the following 
discussions in this paper. This level of service with regard to university education is 
hereinafter referred to as the baseline educational service. 
If the supply of students is 300−∆ (∆∈(0,100)) and if the universities provide 
the baseline educational service, they would have 100−∆/3 students, as the 
students’ choices are random. Here, if one of them incurs extra costs and provides 
services of a higher quality, it may be able to fulfill its capacity of 100 students. 
Therefore, the provision of educational services of the same quality would not 
yield a state of equilibrium. 
Equilibrium would result when A and B meet their capacity by providing 
educational services of a higher quality. For C, with 100−∆ students, it would occur 
when they provide the baseline educational service. In this scenario, the quality the 
educational services offered by A and B is equivalent to the level resulting from the 
costs paid by A and B pay — which equal precisely the loss in C’s revenue 
resulting from its failure to fill its capacity. Consequently, C’s balance of operations 
is equal to those of A and B, leaving no incentives for C to alter the state of 
equilibrium. Even if C provides educational services equal to the quality of that by 
A and B, the number students C could recruit would be 100−∆/3, and C’s operating 
balance would then be lower than that when recruiting 100−∆ when providing the 
baseline educational service. Moreover, when A and B reduce the quality of their 
services such that they are no longer above the baseline, this would then provide C 
an incentive to provide services equal to those offered by A and B. Over concerns 
about a decrease in their operating balances, A and B would not be induced to alter 
the equilibrium state. Hence, this is how equilibrium holds.2 
This leads to the question of what would happen to student competition under 
this condition. Because the educational services of A and B are better than that by 
C, students are going to compete more strongly. Therefore, when the overall 
student supply is reduced, it remains possible for A and B to meet their student 
capacities by offering better quality education—a feasible scenario of educational 
service improvement through competition under student capacity regulations. This, 
however, applies only when C can afford the loss of operating revenue resulting 
from the decreased number of registered students. If C cannot handle the loss and 
is closed, the student supply would eventually be identical to the situation which 
arises when the student supply exceeds the total capacity. In other words, A and B 
will be capable of meeting their student capacities only by providing the baseline 
 
2Equilibrium does not hold when two universities provide the baseline educational service. If this scenario is 
true and hence each university has 100−∆/2 students, a slight upgrade in the educational services would enable the 
universities to meet their admissions capacities of 100 students, though this is not a state of equilibrium. 
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educational service, i.e., returning to the starting point with no educational quality 
improvement in either. 
The quality educational services under the student capacity regulation can be 
summarized as follows. When the student supply exceeds the total capacity, the 
education quality level would be at the baseline. When the student supply drops 
below the total capacity, the university may provide better quality education only 
when there is a university incapable of meeting its capacity. Moreover, upon the 
closure of this university, the overall quality level would revert to the baseline. 
Shortly, as long as the capacity regulation is in effect, the baseline educational 
service remains predominant. Even in the exceptional case of a short supply of 
students, at which point which some universities may opt to upgrade their 
education quality, the overall quality would be at the baseline level in the end after 
the forcing out of the university that fails to meet its capacity. 
At this stage, we move on to the case without regulations on student capacity 
levels. For convenience of the comparison, all three universities are assumed to 
have an admissions capacity of 100 students at the beginning. The supply of 
students is set to 300+∆ (∆ > 0). Each university then establishes a student 
capacity level with which its marginal revenue (the gain in revenue when one 
additional student is admitted) is equal to the marginal cost (the cost to provide the 
additional student with the targeted services). The structure of the marginal revenue 
is identical at all three universities, as assumed above, but that of the marginal cost 
can vary slightly depending on the level of efficiency in the administrative, 
governance and incentive structures. Therefore, the different student capacities of 
the universities are set autonomously. 
For convenience of the analysis, A’s cost structure is the most efficient, followed 
by those of B and C. The student capacities which lead to the highest levels of 
efficiency are 130, 120 and 100. Here, ∆＞60. The capacities vary depending on 
the efficiency level of the cost structure, and additional revenue is set to be used 
only for an upgrade in the educational services; educational improvements are the 
sole target of each university’s spending, as each is a non-profit legal person and is 
not allowed to own operating revenues itself. Therefore, with regard to the quality 
of educational services, A is first, B second and C third. Here, C’s quality of 
education is higher than the baseline educational service under the capacity 
regulation. Students at these universities are given more opportunities to enjoy a 
better education compared to those at universities affected by the capacity control 
regulation. Furthermore, B and C have an incentive to benchmark A so as to make 
their cost structure work more efficiently. Therefore A, motivated by competitive 
catch-up activities by B and C, will have an incentive to be more efficient than the 
other two. 
Meanwhile, when ∆＜60, C, with the lowest education quality and efficiency, 
will not be able to meet its capacity. Its survival depends on whether or not it can 
achieve efficiency. This in other words means that more efficient educational 
services would be available. During this process, it is students that will eventually 
benefit from the better efficiency and educational quality brought by the 
autonomous capacity setting. It is this autonomy that provides more students with 
better quality education, while capacity control efforts provide the baseline 
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educational service. 
 
B. Hypotheses on the Effects of Regulated Admissions Quotas 
 
Generally, universities encourage enrollments and in order to be selected by 
prospective students, entering into sharp competition with each other. However, 
government regulated admissions quotas may change these common practices. 
From a purely theoretical perspective, regulated admissions quotas eliminate the 
pressure of competition among universities to attract more students. This would in 
turn limit their incentive to offer a higher level of educational services (from the 
students’ perspective when considering the cost of attending university) than the 
baseline level, as it would not result in increased enrollment. In such a case, the 
competition between universities would not entail enhancing the level of education 
to attract more students but based on the standard of the prospective students. As 
such, the educational performance capabilities of universities would be contingent 
on the competency level of the enrollees for the respective year. 
In contrast, if universities were to have autonomy with regards to their 
admissions quotas, this would encourage them to become more competitive and to 
make additional efforts to upgrade their educational services in order to increase 
their enrollment. This would consequently motivate neighboring universities to 
boost their own efforts for fear of becoming obsolete. In such a case, universities’ 
educational performance levels would become dependent on the amount of effort 
made. 
Under the premise above, Table 12 shows the trends in educational services and 
educational performance levels with both regulated admissions quotas and 
autonomous admissions quotas. 
The above discussion of the differing effects of regulated and autonomous 
admissions quotas can be applied to Korea’s case, where universities in 
metropolitan areas have regulated admissions quotas while those in non-
metropolitan areas do not. Generally, Korean students prefer universities in 
metropolitan areas (which have a location premium). Ergo, the competition to enter 
metropolitan universities is markedly higher than the competition to enter 
universities in non-metropolitan areas. Furthermore, the university rankings, based  
 
TABLE 12—EFFECTS OF REGULATED AND AUTONOMOUS ADMISSIONS QUOTAS 
 Regulated admissions quota Autonomous admissions quota 
Efforts to improve educational service Low High 
Educational service Baseline educational service (A)3 Higher than (A) 
Education performance Dependent on  
the competency level of students 
Dependent on  
the university’s efforts 
Note: The baseline level of educational service refers to the level of university educational service that, after taking 
into account the time and cost of completing university, nullifies the merit of going on to university from high 
school.  
 
3Samples from teacher’s colleges, the Korea National University of Education, remote colleges, broadcasting 
universities, technical colleges, cyber universities, and various school and graduate schools amongst others were 
excluded. Universities that were established solely for the purpose of training religious leaders and to teach the arts 
and physical education, and are hence not subject to government support, were also excluded. 
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on entrance exam scores, for the former are also higher. In this respect, universities 
in metropolitan areas are able to select a higher level of students. 
Regulating admissions quotas in metropolitan areas was originally a part of the 
effort to suppress the excessive population inflow into metropolitan areas. 
However, despite the increasing population in metropolitan areas, fixed quotas 
have exacerbated the excessive demand for placement at universities in 
metropolitan areas and have ramped up the competition for private education 
(tutoring and supplementary education). At the same time, the excessive demand is 
weakening the competition between universities. 
Based on a theoretical analysis of regulated and autonomous admissions quotas, 
there is a high probability that the excessive demand resulting from regulated 
admissions quotas in metropolitan areas is lowering the efforts of these universities 
to enhance their educational services. Specifically, if universities had to compete 
with each other to attract more students, this would serve as an incentive for them 
to enhance the quality of the education they offer. In turn, these efforts would have 
an impact on their educational performance capabilities. 
As such, the following theoretical hypotheses can be established pertaining to 
the behavior of universities with regard to educational input and performance in 
both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Of course, this assumes that the 
universities in metropolitan areas have a location premium. 
 
Hypothesis 1: [Efforts to improve educational services] Compared to 
universities in metropolitan areas which have a location premium and for 
which excessive demand exists due to the regulation on admissions quotas, 
universities in non-metropolitan areas, which have to compete in order to 
attract more students, would be more committed to enhancing their 
educational services. 
 
Hypothesis 2: [Education performance] Universities in non-metropolitan 
areas would have higher levels of educational performance compared to the 
quality of their enrollees. Additionally, their educational performance levels 
would be affected by input variables that reflect their efforts to improve their 
educational services. However, universities in metropolitan areas, which have 
less of an incentive, would show lower educational performance levels 
compared to the standard of their enrollees, and their educational 
performance levels would depend on input variables that are relevant to the 
efforts made. 
 
Although it would be difficult to examine the validity of the above hypotheses 
closely, this paper will attempt to find circumstantial evidence through a series of 
analyses that are based on variables for which data were available. 
First, the educational performance levels and the graduate employment rates are 
measured. Although the quality of employment cannot be reflected, with 
government focusing on the gradate employment rate in university evaluations and 
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in funding decisions, it is a vital performance indicator. There are many input 
factors that affect education performance. However, the main factors can be 
broadly divided into two categories, i.e., preliminary input factors such as the 
quality of enrollees, and process input factors which are related to the quality of the 
universities’ educational services. 
For the preliminary input factor, this paper uses enrollees’ CSAT results, and for 
the process input factor, the percentage of courses taught by full-time faculty was 
used as the key variable along with the educational environment, i.e., the number 
of full-time faculty members per student, the amount of government funding per 
student, and the amount of university investment per student, as the control 
variable. 
 
C. Hypotheses Tests 
 
The subjects for the empirical analysis presented in this paper are limited to 
private four-year universities that are eligible for government funding. Data on the 
variables necessary for the analysis were extracted from the government’s Higher 
Education in Korea report (http://www.academyinfo.go.kr). 4  A total of 391 
observations of 132 universities from 2011 to 2013 were used. 
The most appropriate criterion for educational performance is the disparity 
between students’ competence levels at the points of enrollment and graduation. 
Variables that reflect this may vary, but this paper uses the graduate employment 
rate 5  as the dependent variable. The employment rate denotes the market’s 
evaluation of the graduates’ abilities, and when entrance scores, which show 
students’ competence levels at enrollment, are considered here, educational 
performance can be confirmed. 
For the explanatory variables, the percentage of courses taught by full-time 
faculty and the number of full-faculty members per student, government funding, 
and grant transfer amounts from industry-academic cooperation departments were 
used.6 Entrance scores have the largest impact on the graduate employment rate 
 
4Given that the analysis data in this study are based on three-year panel data (2011-2013), a fixed-effect 
model may be most suitable. However, there are limitations when applying this model, as the variables used 
cannot change radically over the short term; hence, a pooled ordinary least-square model was used. 
5The employment rate (as of 2012) = {(those with workplace-based health insurance + graduates employed 
on campus + overseas employment + employed persons in farming businesses)/employable persons} X 100. The 
employed (as of 2012) include those with workplace-based health insurance, graduates employed on campus, 
overseas employment and persons employed in farming businesses. Graduates employed on campus (as of 2012) 
refer to those with workplace-based health insurance, as of the date of the survey, who signed a contract which is 
longer than one year with a university foundation or relevant institution (industry-education foundation, university 
or enterprise) and are paid more than the minimum wage; the salary of a person employed at the per-hour 
minimum wage of 4,580 won (as of 2012) is 957,220 won. Overseas employment refers to those who work for 
more than 15 hours per week and maintain an employment contract which is longer than 91 days. Persons 
employed in farming businesses refer to those without workplace-based health insurance working in farming 
businesses as of the date of the survey. Employable persons (according to the 2012 guideline): Graduates - (those 
who are advancing into higher education, undertaking their mandatory military service, those unable to work, the 
officially excluded and foreign students). Persons who are unable to work refer to those who are inmates, dead, 
those who have immigrated overseas and patients hospitalized for more than six months. Persons who are deemed 
officially excluded refer to those who are medical aid recipients, graduates with a degree from religious leader 
training courses, female military officers attending a training course before being officially commissioned and 
persons eligible for education courses provided by professional education institutes for aviation workers. 
6There are diverse ways to enhance educational performance. Examples include adjusting the percentage of 
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and as such are the most suitable variable; however, due to difficulties in obtaining 
data, placement scores from private university entrance exam organizations were 
used (CSAT score percentile: CSAT score out of 400 points (sum of points for the 
four sections) converted into a percentile). Also, variables that reflect whether the 
respective universities were established after the implementation of the normative 
system for university establishment (implemented in 1997: policy to ensure that 
universities can be established when the requirements are met)7 and the admissions 
quotas were added as control variables. Finally, in order to control the disparity in 
the employment possibilities of different majors, this paper used the percentage of 
students majoring in humanities and social sciences as well as arts and physical 
education. 
 
1. Percentage of Courses Taught by Full-time Faculty 
 
Under the assumption that the percentage of classes taught by full-time faculty 
correlates to a university’s efforts to enhance their educational service, this paper 
deduces (as shown in Hypothesis 1) that universities in non-metropolitan areas 
have a higher percentage of courses taught by full-time faculty than those in 
metropolitan areas. In order to confirm this, Table 13 uses the combined data 
pertaining to the observed values from universities in metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas to verify the differences in the percentages of courses taught by 
full-time members of the faculty. 
Even if the average CSAT score for each university was controlled to take into 
account the discrepancy in the average competency level of students at 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan universities (a comparison between universities 
with similar scores), it was again revealed that the percentage of courses taught by 
full-time faculty members at non-metropolitan universities was higher than that at 
metropolitan universities by nearly 11%. 
As shown by the coefficients of the interaction terms in Table 15, the percentage 
of courses taught by full-time faculty members was not influenced by the enrollees’ 
entrance scores. This implies that non-metropolitan universities are more 
committed to enhancing their educational services than those in metropolitan areas 
regardless of the competency level of the students. Meanwhile, although full-time 
faculty members conduct research in addition to teaching, the percentage of 
courses taught by full-time faculty cannot be used to measure their levels of  
 
 
courses taught by full-time faculty, increasing the number of full-time faculty workers, and making efforts to 
secure government funding and/or efforts to promote industry-education cooperation. Which ones are used depend 
on the marginal costs. Specifically, government funding will depend on official measures, and industry-education 
cooperation and university enterprises entail considerable costs. In particular, increasing full-time faculty from the 
universities’ perspective will be a considerable burden in both the short and long term. As such, the easiest method 
for universities is to adjust the percentage of courses taught by full-time faculty.  
7Before the adoption of the normative system, the necessary procedures to obtain permission to establish a 
university were highly complicated and difficult to complete. The system simplified the process, allowing 
universities to be established if the requirements are met. The government sought a change in Korea’s higher 
education policy paradigm in 1995, often called the May 31 Education Reform, and its core policy was the 
creation of a normative system. Now that the system has become fully initiated, Korea’s higher education system 
has become corpulent, according to certain critics. 
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TABLE 13—DIFFERENCE IN THE PERCENTAGE OF  
COURSES TAUGHT BY FULL-TIME FACULTY 
Variable Total 
Average CSAT score (A) 
(0 ~ 400) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
Non-metropolitan university (B) 10.843*** 
(3.769) 
(A) * (B) Interaction -0.022 
(0.016) 
Year dummy and relevant variables controlled ○ 
Constant  75.299*** 
(5.517) 
Obs. 384 
Adjusted coefficient of determination 0.2968 
Note: Figures in (  ) are standard errors * p＜0.1; ** p＜0.05; *** p＜0.01. 
Relevant control variables include whether the university was established after the 
adoption of the normative system, the log value of the admissions quota, and the 
proportion of humanities and social sciences and arts and physical education 
majors. 
Source: Reproduction of data provided by Higher Education in Korea 
(http://www.academyinfo.go.kr).  
 
research accomplishment.8 However, even when these differences are considered, 
the results show that the greater level of commitment by universities in non-
metropolitan areas to increase the percentage of courses taught by full-time faculty 
remains unchanged. 
 
2. Graduate Employment Rate 
 
Location premiums enable universities in metropolitan areas to attract more 
competent students. In turn, the students’ high competence levels serve to increase 
the respective universities’ educational performance levels (graduate employment 
rates). Under the assumption that the efforts by universities in all areas are at the 
same level, the graduate employment rates of metropolitan universities should be 
higher or at least similar to those of non-metropolitan universities. However, this 
paper reveals that the graduate employment rates of metropolitan universities are 
on average 56.2%, 3.1%p lower than that of non-metropolitan universities (59.3%), 
indicating that the former has inefficiencies which hinder their efforts to enhance 
their educational performance and make improvements. 
Furthermore, despite the reservation wage, i.e., the subjective minimum wage 
level that determines employment, being higher on average for students from 
metropolitan universities, the number of instances of delayed employment is also 
higher. Accordingly, the graduate employment rates of metropolitan universities 
 
8From a quantitative perspective, there are no statistical differences in the number research papers per full-
time faculty member published in research journals listed in the NRFK. However, with regard to internationally 
published papers or SCI papers per faculty member, there is a difference of 0.1 between metropolitan (0.2) and 
non-metropolitan (0.1) universities, meaning that for every two papers published by ten faculty members of 
metropolitan universities, one will be published by a researcher at a non-metropolitan university. 
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may be lower in the short term. It should be noted, that the quality of employment 
was not reflected. Ergo, the analysis of the graduate employment rate should be 
supplemented with an analysis using variables that reflect the quality of 
employment, e.g., the average wage and/or the numbers of permanent positions. 
However, as the relevant data was unavailable, this research is left for the future. 
The following section will analyze the different effects of input factors on the 
graduate employment rate. The focus will be placed on comparing the relative 
effects by the preliminary input factors (enrollee scores) and the process input 
factors (efforts to improve educational service) on educational performance 
(employment). Even under the assumption that there is a systematic difference in 
the quality of lectures and entrance scores, as the analysis in this paper divides 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan universities and examines the factors 
influencing the graduate employment rate in each league, it represents an 
opportunity to investigate the differences between the behaviors of universities 
based on whether they have regulated admissions quotas or not. 
Table 14 shows that the educational performance (graduate employment rate) of 
metropolitan universities is contingent on individual students’ competence levels 
and not on the efforts of the respective universities. A rise of 100 points in the 
average CSAT score accounts for a 2.2~5%p increase in the graduate employment 
rate, but the percentage of courses taught by a full-time faculty member is found to 
have contributed little to the employment rate. 
 
TABLE 14—ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT  
INFLUENCE METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITIES’ GRADUATE EMPLOYMENT RATES 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of courses taught by full-time faculty (%) -0.051 
(0.054) 
-0.049 
(0.054) 
-0.036 
(0.056) 
-0.054 
(0.054) 
Average CSAT score (0 ~ 400) 0.050***
(0.010) 
0.048***
(0.011) 
0.044*** 
(0.012) 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
Log value of the admissions capacity -4.719***
(0.968) 
-4.567***
(1.042) 
-4.632*** 
(1.046) 
-4.141*** 
(1.002) 
University established after  
the adoption of the normative system 
2.335 
(1.980) 
2.036 
(2.121) 
2.279 
(2.141) 
1.720 
(2.042) 
Proportion of humanities &  
social sciences and arts & physical education majors 
-0.187***
(0.035) 
-0.184***
(0.036) 
-0.169*** 
(0.040) 
-0.172*** 
(0.038) 
Number of full-time faculty per student   4.921 (12.280) 
2.451 
(12.615) 
1.828 
(12.001) 
Log value for the amount of  
government funding per student   
0.350 
(0.403) 
0.260 
(0.384) 
Log value for per-student grants transferred from 
industry-academic cooperation departments and  
school-based enterprises 
   0.008*** (0.002) 
Year dummy controlled ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Constant value 89.486***
(7.848) 
88.368***
(8.351) 
86.551*** 
(8.615) 
89.438*** 
(8.227) 
Obs.  155 155 155 155 
Adjusted coefficient of determination 0.3331 0.3293 0.3281 0.3920 
Note: Figures in (  ) are standard errors * p＜0.1; ** p＜0.05; *** p＜0.01. 
Source: Reproduction of data provided by Higher Education in Korea (http://www.academyinfo.go.kr).  
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The above findings prove that universities in metropolitan areas have little 
incentive to improve their educational services. Indeed, the reason behind the 
insignificant contribution of the percentage of courses taught by full-time faculty to 
the improvement of educational performance may be that there is an ample supply 
of competent part-time lecturers in the region whose quality levels are similar to 
those of full-time lecturers. However, even if the quality of part-time lecturers is 
superior, the bond that full-time faculty members have with the students and their 
education must be taken into account. Furthermore, as expected, Table 14 confirms 
that graduate employment rates decrease with an increase in the number of 
enrollments and students majoring in the humanities and social sciences, and arts 
and physical education majors.9 The same phenomenon can be seen in Table 4 for 
universities in non-metropolitan areas. 
Table 15 shows for universities in non-metropolitan areas, educational 
performance (the graduate employment rate) is contingent on their efforts and not 
on the competence level of the students. Moreover, although CSAT scores are 
unrelated to the graduate employment rate, a 10%p rise in the percentage of 
courses taught by full-time faculty is equivalent to a 1.07~1.19%p increase in the 
graduate employment rate. This also implies that unlike metropolitan universities, 
there is a wide quality gap between part-time lecturers and full-time faculty at non-
metropolitan universities. Nevertheless, the results are still significant because 
increasing the percentage of courses taught by full-time faculty members is a major 
part of universities’ efforts to enhance the quality of their education. What is 
confirmed here is that the educational performance levels of non-metropolitan 
universities that do not have a location premium and that have regulated 
admissions quotas can be changed through the efforts of the respective universities. 
Furthermore, contrary to general beliefs, the graduate employment rates of non-
metropolitan universities established after the adoption of the normative system are 
higher than those of universities established before this system.10 
As shown above, despite metropolitan universities having higher quality 
students, the graduate employment rates are lower. Furthermore, the graduate 
employment rates of metropolitan universities are determined by preliminary input 
factors such as the students’ entrance scores, while those of non-metropolitan 
universities are affected by process input factors such as the efforts made to 
improve educational services. However, due to the limited amount of available 
data, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the efforts made by universities in 
metropolitan areas to enhance their educational performance levels are weak purely 
based on the results of this analysis. 
Nonetheless, based on the theoretical argument that excessive demand reduces 
the incentive for universities that have regulated admissions quotas to improve the 
quality of their educational services, this paper has deduced implications 
 
9If investments do not correlate with the increase in students, this could negatively impact students’ 
educational performance levels and may lead to difficulties in the management of students, lectures and 
employment and start-ups. As such, small universities are preferable to large universities with regard to student 
and degree management, which is the basis for the argument that even with autonomy, admissions quotas cannot 
be limitless. 
10Because the lecturers at universities that were established after the adoption of university establishment 
regulations are younger, fixed costs such as wages are low. Therefore, such universities are able to invest to 
enhance their educational performance. 
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TABLE 15—ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT  
INFLUENCE NON-METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITIES’ GRADUATE EMPLOYMENT RATES 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of courses taught by full-time faculty (%) 0.107**
(0.048) 
0.115** 
(0.049) 
0.118** 
(0.049) 
0.119** 
(0.049) 
Average CSAT score expressed as a percentile of 
the respective university (0 ~ 400) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
Log value of the admissions quota -1.176**
(0.511) 
-1.292** 
(0.535) 
-1.323** 
(0.536) 
-1.333** 
(0.540) 
Universities established after the adoption of the 
normative system 
3.515***
(1.264) 
3.532***
(1.266) 
3.619*** 
(1.269) 
3.624*** 
(1.272) 
Proportion of humanities & social sciences and arts 
& physical education majors 
-0.234***
(0.028) 
-0.238***
(0.029) 
-0.232*** 
(0.030) 
-0.232*** 
(0.030) 
Number of full-time faculty per student   -10.622 (14.503) 
-11.287 
(14.517) 
-11.327 
(14.552) 
Log value for the amount of government funding 
per student   
0.335 
(0.332) 
0.330 
(0.333) 
Log value for per-student grant amounts transferred 
from industry-education foundations and school-
based enterprises 
   0.001 (0.006) 
Year dummy controlled ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Constant 74.679***
(6.222) 
75.415***
(6.309) 
73.715*** 
(6.530) 
73.843*** 
(6.583) 
Obs.  222 222 222 222 
Adjusted coefficient of determination 0.4248 0.4236 0.4236 0.4210 
Note: Figures in (  ) are standard errors * p＜0.1; ** p＜0.05; *** p＜0.01. 
Source: Reproduction of data provided by Higher Education in Korea (http://www.academyinfo.go.kr). 
 
regarding the behavior of universities in metropolitan areas. Specifically, although 
the regulated admissions quota was implemented to alleviate the excessive 
concentration of admissions in metropolitan areas, the current structure (quotas can 
be filled without effort and the number of enrollments cannot be increased even 
with more effort) will fail to encourage universities to boost efforts to strengthen 
their educational performance levels. 
 
V. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
In order to enhance the competitiveness and educational performance 
capabilities of higher education overall in Korea, universities must be given 
autonomy and an incentive system must be established to generate competition so 
as to provide better quality education. In particular, to achieve this based on the 
pursuit of ‘consumer-oriented’ education and university restructuring through 
‘voting with one’s feet’, universities must be selected by more prospective students 
through the improvement of the educational services offered by them. However, 
under the current policies, which strictly control the admissions quotas of 
metropolitan universities, excessive demand will continue, with the result being 
weakened incentives to enhance the quality of educational services. 
120 KDI Journal of Economic Policy FEBRUARY 2016 
From this perspective, it is at least theoretically valid to provide universities with 
autonomy over their admissions quotas rather than controlling them with 
government policies. Moreover, although the original aim of regulated admissions 
quotas was to control the overflow in metropolitan universities, the question of 
how long a policy that serves to overheat the competition for private education 
while weakening the competition between universities to improve educational 
services can continue needs to be addressed. 
The government’s current university restructuring policies include ranking 
universities based on evaluation indices and adjusting or maintaining admissions 
quotas accordingly. Additionally, government funding is increased based on 
universities’ voluntary efforts to reduce their quotas. However, despite the fact that 
the aim of providing the incentives is to correlate the provision of higher education 
with the declining student population, these policies can introduce the following 
problems. 
Korean private universities are highly dependent on tuition-based revenue 
because, as private universities in metropolitan areas with regulated admissions 
quotas as well as regulated tuition, they have little financial leeway. On the other 
hand, universities that are in less demand and are able to reduce their admissions 
quotas remain unaffected by the reductions or by revenue from funding provided 
by the government to meet the reduced quota. However, this situation results in the 
failure to weed out uncompetitive universities (based on weak demand). The effect 
of quota reductions on universities in high demand can take two forms, both of 
which also result in inefficiency. First, the reductions serve to reduce the 
opportunities for students to enroll in universities of their choice. Secondly, the 
reduction in admissions will deteriorate the universities’ finances, which will in 
turn cut education investments and eventually diminish the quality of education. 
The most appropriate method to restructure universities is one that is founded on 
the market function, which is centered on consumer choice. However, considering 
the constraints of the location premiums of metropolitan areas, this will be an 
impossible feat. In this respect, rather than focusing on the quality of educational 
services, a level playing ground which minimizes the rent of the location premium 
should be established. 
An example of this would be to maintain or reduce the current level of the total 
admissions quota for metropolitan areas or to consider giving those universities 
autonomy to decide on their level within the total admissions quota. More 
pointedly, universities would be allowed to compete with other universities in their 
respective regions. There will be little opposition from universities in non-
metropolitan areas, as this does not entail any significant changes. As such, the 
political implications will be minimal. Of course, in this case there would be the 
burden of regularly adjusting the admissions quotas of metropolitan universities to 
maintain fairness to those in non-metropolitan areas. 
Additionally, there are numerous other measures, including integrating and 
fostering non-metropolitan universities or relocating metropolitan universities to 
non-metropolitan areas. In any case, a societal consensus must be reached. 
Whichever measure is selected, consideration must be given to whether the 
measures revitalize competition to enhance the quality of educational services at 
universities. Furthermore, prospective students must be allowed to make their own 
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choices based on detailed and transparent information about the universities’ 
educational environments and performance levels, and universities which are not 
competitive must be weeded out. 
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